150

Definitions

150 In this Part,

guardian includes any person who has in law or in fact the custody or control of another person; (tuteur)

public place includes any place to which the public have access as of right or by invitation, express or implied; (endroit public)

theatre includes any place that is open to the public where entertainments are given, whether or not any charge is made for admission. (théâtre)

Annotations

  • Part V
Tags

150.1

Consent no defence

150.1 (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (2.2), when an accused is charged with an offence under section 151 or 152 or subsection 153(1), 160(3) or 173(2) or is charged with an offence under section 271, 272 or 273 in respect of a complainant under the age of 16 years, it is not a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge.

Exception — complainant aged 12 or 13

(2) When an accused is charged with an offence under section 151 or 152, subsection 173(2) or section 271 in respect of a complainant who is 12 years of age or more but under the age of 14 years, it is a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge if the accused

(a) is less than two years older than the complainant; and

(b) is not in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, is not a person with whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency and is not in a relationship with the complainant that is exploitative of the complainant.

Exception — complainant aged 14 or 15

(2.1) If an accused is charged with an offence under section 151 or 152, subsection 173(2) or section 271 in respect of a complainant who is 14 years of age or more but under the age of 16 years, it is a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge if the accused

(a) is less than five years older than the complainant; and

(b) is not in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, is not a person with whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency and is not in a relationship with the complainant that is exploitative of the complainant.

Exception for transitional purposes

(2.2) When the accused referred to in subsection (2.1) is five or more years older than the complainant, it is a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge if, on the day on which this subsection comes into force,

(a) the accused is the common-law partner of the complainant, or has been cohabiting with the complainant in a conjugal relationship for a period of less than one year and they have had or are expecting to have a child as a result of the relationship; and

(b) the accused is not in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, is not a person with whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency and is not in a relationship with the complainant that is exploitative of the complainant.

Exception for transitional purposes

(2.3) If, immediately before the day on which this subsection comes into force, the accused referred to in subsection (2.1) is married to the complainant, it is a defence that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge.

Exemption for accused aged twelve or thirteen

(3) No person aged twelve or thirteen years shall be tried for an offence under section 151 or 152 or subsection 173(2) unless the person is in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant, is a person with whom the complainant is in a relationship of dependency or is in a relationship with the complainant that is exploitative of the complainant.

Mistake of age

(4) It is not a defence to a charge under section 151 or 152, subsection 160(3) or 173(2), or section 271, 272 or 273 that the accused believed that the complainant was 16 years of age or more at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant.

Idem

(5) It is not a defence to a charge under section 153, 170, 171 or 172 or subsection 286.‍1(2), 286.‍2(2) or 286.‍3(2) that the accused believed that the complainant was 18 years of age or more at the time the offence is alleged to have been committed unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant.

Mistake of age

(6) An accused cannot raise a mistaken belief in the age of the complainant in order to invoke a defence under subsection (2) or (2.1) unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant.

Annotations

  • Part V
Tags

151

Constitutionality

  • The mandatory minimum sentence imposed in paragraph (a) of section 151 has been found to violate section 12 of the Charter in a manner that could not be saved by section 1: R v Hood, 2018 NSCA 18; R v Scofield, 2019 BCCA 3; R v EJB, 2018 ABCA 1452; R v JED, 2018 MBCA 123; R v ML, 2016 ONSC 7082; R v BJT, 2016 ONSC 6616.
  • The mandatory minimum sentence imposed in paragraph (b) of section 151 has been found to violate section 12 of the Charter in a manner that could not be saved by section 1: R v Drumonde, 2019 ONSC 1005.

Sexual interference

151 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of the body of a person under the age of 16 years

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.

Annotations

  • Part V
Tags

152

Invitation to sexual touching

152 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a person under the age of 16 years to touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, the body of any person, including the body of the person who so invites, counsels or incites and the body of the person under the age of 16 years,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.

Annotations

  • Part V
Tags

153

Sexual exploitation

153 (1) Every person commits an offence who is in a position of trust or authority towards a young person, who is a person with whom the young person is in a relationship of dependency or who is in a relationship with a young person that is exploitative of the young person, and who

(a) for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of the body of the young person; or

(b) for a sexual purpose, invites, counsels or incites a young person to touch, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, the body of any person, including the body of the person who so invites, counsels or incites and the body of the young person.

Punishment

(1.1) Every person who commits an offence under subsection (1)

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of 90 days.

Inference of sexual exploitation

(1.2) A judge may infer that a person is in a relationship with a young person that is exploitative of the young person from the nature and circumstances of the relationship, including

(a) the age of the young person;

(b) the age difference between the person and the young person;

(c) the evolution of the relationship; and

(d) the degree of control or influence by the person over the young person.

Definition of young person

(2) In this section, young person means a person 16 years of age or more but under the age of eighteen years.a

Annotations | French

  • Section 153

     

  • Elements of the Offence:

     

  • Sexual exploitation applies to four distinct categories of individuals:

     

    • (1) Those who are in a position of trust towards a young person;

       

    • (2) Those who are in a position of authority with respect to a young person;

       

    • (3) Those with whom the young person has a relationship of dependency or reliance; and

       

    • (4) Those who are in an exploitative relationship with a young person.

       

  • An individual who falls into one or more of the above categories is prohibited from engaging in the sexual activities described in paragraphs (a)-(b) of subsection (1). For the purposes of this section, “young person” is defined under subsection (2) as those who are 16 years or older but under the age of 18; R v Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171 at para 16; R v Anderson, 2009 PECA 4 at paras 64, 71.

     

  • Under subsection 1, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:

     

    • (1) The complainant is a "young person" within the meaning of subsection (2);

       

    • (2) The accused had the intention to engage in one or more of the activities referred to in subsection (1);

       

    • (3) The accused engaged in one or more of the activities referred to in subsection (1) for a sexual purpose;

       

    • (4) The accused was in a position of trust, authority, dependency, or an otherwise exploitative relationship with the young person.

       

  • The Crown does not need to establish that an accused "actually" abused their power or position in regard to the young person to obtain their "consent" for the sexual activities. Activity falling under this subsection is criminal regardless of whether it is consensual. because it is always the responsibility of the adult to decline sexual contact with a young person; R v Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171 at paras 16, 22-23, 26 (SCC); R v Hann, [1990] NJ No 342 (TD); R v G(TF), [1992] OJ No 264 at paras 5-6 (Ont CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1992] 3 SCCA No 398; R v PBB, 2007 ONCA 722 at paras 6-7, leave to appeal to SCC refused, [2007] SCCA No 616.

     

  • The fact that the young person appears to consent to the sexual activity, does not appear vulnerable, or does not view the relationship as one of trust, authority, dependency, or as exploitative is not relevant to the analysis under subsection (1); R v Aird, 2013 ONCA 447 at para 24 (Ont CA); R v PS, [1993] OJ No 704 at para 30(ONCJ); R v Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171 at para 16 (SCC); R v Anderson, 2009 PECA 4 at paras 52; R v Guitard, 2002 NBCA 99 at para 23; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 151, 154.

     

  • The Crown must prove that the touching identified in ss. 153(1)(a) and (b) is for "sexual purpose". The test is objective and considers whether, in the circumstances, a reasonable observer would be able to see the "sexual or carnal" context of the assault. Some of the relevant (but non-exhaustive) considerations in this inquiry are:

     

    • (1) The area of the body touched;

       

    • (2) The nature of the contact;

       

    • (3) The situational context in which it occurred;

       

    • (4) Any words and gestures accompanying the act; and

       

    • (5) Any other circumstance surrounding the conduct, including threats and application of force.

       

  • The accused’s intent may be a relevant factor in determining if the conduct was sexual, including for a motive of sexual gratification. However, a motive of sexual gratification is not necessary for a finding of sexual purpose; R v Trachy, 2019 ONCA 622 at para 3; R v Chase, 1987] 2 SCR 293 at para 11 (SCC); R v D.C.S., 2023 NSSC 255 at para 53

     

  • General Principles

     

  • When assessing whether a sexually exploitative relationship between an accused and a young person exists, the perspective of the young person's family in the matter is relevant but not determinative to the analysis. For instance, the amount of trust the family of a young person places on the accused may be relevant to whether they were in a position of trust, authority, dependency, or an otherwise exploitive relationship; R v D(C), [2000] OJ No 1667 at para 76-78 (Ont CA); R v L (DB), [1995] OJ No 2775 at para 7 (Ont CA).

     

  • An accused viewing the relationship as high stakes where they would personally have "a lot to lose" through the discovery of their relationship with a young person does not mean that the young person held a position of strength in the relationship. It is not determinative of whether that relationship was exploitative; R v Olson, 2016 BCPC 150 at para 58.

     

  • A difference in age is not determinative of the nature of the relationship. A significant gap in age between the accused and the young person may support the conclusion that the accused was in a position of trust, authority, or dependency with the young person. However, the court is not prevented from finding that the relationship falls into one of the four categories under subsection (1) when the accused and the victim are close in age; R v L (DB), [1995] OJ No 2775 at para 9;; R v Poncelet, 2008 BCSC 202 at para 58; R v Martin, 2011 ONCJ 401 at para 32, 38-39.

     

  • Adults in a Position of Trust or Authority

     

  • When assessing whether a relationship of trust exists between an adult and a young person, several non-exhaustive considerations include:

     

    • (1) The age gap between the accused and young person;

       

    • (2) How their relationship evolved;

       

    • (3) The accused's status compared to the young person;

       

    • (4) The accused's degree of control, influence, or persuasiveness exercised over the young person; and

       

    • (5) The expectations of the parties affected, which includes the accused, the young person, and their parents.

       

  • R v Aird, 2013 ONCA 447 at para 28; R v Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171 at para 38, (SCC); R v G(G), 2001 BCCA 462 at para 71.

     

  • “Position of trust” and “position of authority” are legally different categories. However, they are related because a position of authority involves a power imbalance, requiring the ability to influence or control the future outcomes of the young person. While a “position of trust” may have those characteristics; it is not required. A position of trust is founded on notions of safety, confidence, and reliability that the nature of the relationship will not be breached.; R v Kyle, [1991] OJ No 2009, (Ont CA); R v PS, [1993] OJ No 704 at para 37 (ONCJ); R v EJB, 2017 ABCA 176 at paras 11-17.

     

  • Individuals who areoften considered in a position of trust include a young persons parents and grandparents, legal guardians, foster parents and certain relatives. Even in relationships outside those listed, a position of trust can exist if the relationship creates an opportunity for the accused to persuade or influence the young person. The vulnerability of the young person to such influence is also a factor to be considered; R v PS, [1993] OJ No 704 at paras 33, 36 (ONCJ).

     

  • In most cases, teachers will be in a position of trust or authority with respect to their students. However, it is possible that a teacher will not be in a position of trust of authority with respect to a particular student, but these cases will be rare and require evidence. For example, even when school is not in session (i.e., during the summer months), a teacher may still be in a position of trust or authority with a student, especially if there is a chance the student will be in their class the next school year. This approach does not undermine the accused's presumption of innocence. The presumption does not require the defence to prove that a teacher-student relationship is not a relationship of trust. Rather, the accused will be required to lead some evidence to reject such a characterization of their relationship. It then falls to the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the relationship between the teacher and student is one of trust or authority.; R v Audet, [1996] 2 SCR 171 at paras 43-47 (SCC); R v Hann, [1990] NJ No 342 (NLTD).

     

  • Boarding schoolteachers and administrators are placed in a more significant position of trust with students because they take the place of the student's parents while they are attending school and away from home; R v Olson, 2016 BCPC 150 at para 59.

     

  • An aspect of “ongoing control” that an accused has over a part of the young person’s life is relevant to the analysis of whether there is a position of trust or authority. For instance, a teacher will have ongoing control over the student when they are no longer their teacher if they continue to teach at the school the student attends while supervising clubs they are involved in; R v Dussiaume, 98 CCC (3d) 217 at p 2-3 (Ont CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1995] 4 SCCA No 272.

     

  • Relationships of Dependency

     

  • A relationship of dependency will involve reliance by the young person on an adult who is in a position of power, trust, or authority, creating a power imbalance. The analysis is fact-dependent, and all the circumstances surrounding the offence must be considered. A young person's reliance on the accused can prove the existence of dependency between the young person and the accused. For example, an exchange of sexual services for goods that the young person becomes reliant upon can create a relationship where the young person is dependent upon the accused; R v Galbraith, [1994] OJ No 808 (Ont CA), leave to appeal to SCC refused, [1994] SCCA No 278.

     

  • Exploitative Relationships with Young Persons

     

  • An exploitative relationship can arise where there is a power imbalance between a young person and an adult even when there is no relationship of trust, authority, or dependency between the two. For a finding of exploitation, the relationship between the parties must be exploitative even in the absence of sexual conduct. This means that the sexual conduct between the accused and complainant cannot be the factor that makes the relationship exploitative. A power imbalance between the parties should be assessed by looking at all the surrounding circumstances, including those set out under subsection 1.2. An exploitative relationship will be found where there is a power imbalance between the adult and young person that makes the young person vulnerable to the conduct and actions of the adult; R v Anderson, 2009 PECA 4 at paras 64, 71, 74.

     

  • Relevant to a consideration of an exploitative relationship is whether the accused insisted that the relationship cease and only resumed upon the strong insistence of the young person. Evidence of this nature can be exculpatory for the accused: R v Anderson, 2009 PECA 4 at para 85.

     

  • The Mandatory Minimum Sentence is Constitutional

     

  • The mandatory minimum sentence under paragraph 153(1.1)(a) is constitutional and does not violate section 12 of the Charter. The vulnerability of young persons captured under subsection (2) and the high degree of moral blameworthiness for sexual exploitation (a specific intent offence) make the one-year minimum sentence proportionate to the offence; R v EJB, 2018 ABCA 239 at para 74; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para 114.

     

    Defences

     

  • Under subsection 150.1(5), an accused can defend themselves from a sexual exploitation charge if:

     

    • (1) They believed the complainant was over 18 at the time of the sexual encounter; and

       

    • (2) They took all reasonable steps to ascertain this information.

       

  • R v Slater, 2005 SKCA 87 at para 23; R v Osborne, [1992] NJ No 312 at para 59 (NLCA); R v Akumu, 2017 BCSC 527 at para 6.

     

  • The requirement to take "all reasonable steps" to ascertain the complainants age is assessed contextually, measuring the steps taken by the accused compared to a reasonable personThe accused must take reasonable steps to ascertain the young person's age before the sexual contact occurs. Only the information known to the accused before the encounter can be assessed in the reasonable steps analysis. In some circumstances, an accused's visual observation that the complainant was 18 or older will be enough. Whether further steps are required depends on whether they are reasonable in the circumstances, and includes (but is not limited to):

     

    • (1) The knowledge of the accused regarding the complainant's physical appearance and behaviour;

       

    • (2) The ages and appearance of those the complainant is around;

       

    • (3) The activities engaged in by the complainant individually, or as part of a group; and

       

    • (4) The times, places, and other circumstances where the accused observes the complainant's conduct.

       

  • The more reasonable an accused’s perception of the complainant’s age, the fewer steps reasonably required of them; R v Akumu, 2017 BCSC 527 at para 7; R v LTP, [1997] BCJ No 24 at para 20 (BCCA); R v George, 2017 SCC 38 at para 9; R v Duran, 2013 ONCA 343 at paras 52-54; R v Osborne, [1992] NJ No 312 (NLCA).

     

  • After looking at the above factors, a court should assess whether a reasonable person in the same circumstances as the accused would believe that the complainant was 18 years or older. If not, they must identify what other steps a reasonable person in the situation would have taken to ascertain the complainant's age; R v LTP, [1997] BCJ No 24 at para 20 (BCCA).

     

  • While the accused's state of mind is relevant to the analysis, their belief that they took all reasonable steps in the circumstances may not necessarily align with what a reasonable person would have done in the situation; R v Hayes, [1991] AJ No 1232 at para 27 (ABQB); R v LTP, [1997] BCJ No 24 at para 20 (BCCA).

     

  • The accused is not required to testify and give evidence supporting their defence of mistaken belief; however, a failure to do so may compromise the accused’s ability to meet their evidential burden. This burden essentially requires some evidence beyond the claim that they were mistaken about the complainant's age in order to adequately raise a defence; R v Osolin, [1993] 4 SCR 595 at 686-687 (SCC); R v Moise, 2016 SKCA 133 at para 23; R v Slater, 2005 SKCA 87 at paras 22-25.

     

  • The fact that a complainant initiated a discussion about sexual intercourse for money with an accused does not dimmish the requirements necessary under subsection 150.1(5). An accused cannot assume a complainant was 18 or older simply because they are a sex trade worker; R v Moise, 2016 SKCA 133 at para 33; R v Akumu, 2017 BCSC 527 at para 48; R v Gashikanyi, 2015 ABCA 1 at para 16.

     

  • The “private use exception” to making and possessing child pornography under s. 163.1. does not apply to the offence of sexual exploitation. The private use exception covers visual recordings that:

     

    • (1) Do not depict unlawful sexual activity;

       

    • (2) Are created with the consent of participants; and

       

    • (3) That are held for private use only.

       

  • Sexual exploitation fails to meet the first portion of the private use exception because it is an offence for an adult to engage in sexual activity with young persons in a relationship based on exploitation, dependency, trust, or authority. If the Crown relies on sexual exploitation to refute the legality of the depicted sexual activity, a judge must determine whether the recordings occurred in the context of an exploitative relationship, and if they did, the private use exception will not apply; R v Barabash, 2015 SCC 29 at paras 1, 18-23, 53.

     

  • Jury Charges

     

  • When charging a jury for the offence of sexual exploitation, judges must ensure that they do not leave the jury to decide whether the accused was in a position of trust, authority, and dependency with the young person if only one of those theories has sufficient evidence to result in a conviction. For example, if there is only sufficient evidence to convict an accused based on findings that they were in a position of trust with the young person, the judge must not invite the jury to also consider if they were in a position of authority or dependency unless there is supporting evidence for those theories; R v GG, 2001 BCCA 462 at para 72.

     

  • Sentencing Principles of Sexual Exploitation

     

  • When sentencing an offender, judges must give primary consideration to the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence under section 718.01 of the Criminal Code. Those factors take precedence over other sentencing objectives, such as rehabilitation of the offender; R v Hajar, 2016 ABCA 222 at para 112.

     

  • To effectively redress sexual violence against young persons, judges must fully comprehend the act's wrongfulness and the current and future harms it causes. Young people are considered a vulnerable population that are disproportionately targeted as the victims of sexual crimes. Sentencing judges must pay particular attention to the groups at greater risk for sexual exploitation, including girls and young women, youth from Indigenous and other marginalized groups, youth with disabilities, and LGBT2Q+ youth. When imposing a sentence in cases of sexual exploitation against a young person who is Indigenous, the court can consider the racialized nature of the crime and the prominence of the sexual victimization of Indigenous youth; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 50, 68-74.

     

  • In recognition of the severe physical and psychological harms sexual violence causes, sentencing judges must impose sentences that reflect

     

    • (1) the effects of the offender's actions on the child, their family, caregivers, and community at large.

       

  • R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 50, 58, 74–75.

     

  • In assessing the gravity of the offence, courts must understand and give effect to:

     

    • (1) The inherent wrongfulness of sexual offences against minors;

       

    • (2) The potential harm that children experience due to these offences; and,

       

    • (3) The actual harm that children suffer as a result of these offences.

       

  • Emphasis must be put on the fact that sexual offences committed against children and young persons are inherently wrong and will always pose a risk of serious harm to victims. However, the degree of wrongfulness and actual harm caused will vary in each case. Courts must reject the belief that there is no serious harm to children and young persons without physical violence. Any physical contact of a sexual nature with a child always constitutes a wrongful act of physical and psychological violence; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 76-79, 82.

     

  • Sentencing courts must consider the "reasonably foreseeable potential harm that flows from sexual violence against children [and young persons] when determining the gravity of the offence." Even if there is no proof the acts have materialized into actual harm to the victim, certain harms associated with sexual violence against children and young persons may only materialize in adulthood. When available, courts shall consider the actual harm experienced by victims as a result of the offence. Victim impact statements will usually provide the best evidence. However, direct evidence from complainants and caregivers is not required for a court to find that a complainant has suffered harm from sexual violence offences; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 82-90.

     

  • When assessing the offender's degree of responsibility, it is important to consider whether they have an underlying misogynistic attitude toward the sexual objectification of women and girls. This consideration is necessary to address the prevalence of sexual violence against girls under 18 years of age; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 89, 180.

     

  • Mitigating and Aggravating Sentencing Factors

     

  • A young person's "willing participation" in sexual acts is not a mitigating factor or legally relevant at sentencing; R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at paras 152-154; R v Pritchard, 2005 ABCA 240 at para 7; R v Hajar, 2016 ABCA 222 at para 100.

     

  • Aggravating sentencing factors for sexual exploitation include, but are not limited to:

     

    • (1) A young person's "extreme vulnerability" due to a developmental disorder;

       

    • (2) Sexual acts where no protection was used;

       

    • (3) That the sex act performed by the accused on the victim caused physical pain to the victim;

       

    • (4) An accused lying about their age to the young person; and

       

    • (5) Significant age gaps between the accused and the young person.

       

  • R v Deck, 2006 ABCA 92 at para 20; R v Hajar, 2016 ABCA 222 at para 119.

     

Tags

153.1

Sexual exploitation of person with disability

153.1 (1) Every person who is in a position of trust or authority towards a person with a mental or physical disability or who is a person with whom a person with a mental or physical disability is in a relationship of dependency and who, for a sexual purpose, counsels or incites that person to touch, without that person’s consent, his or her own body, the body of the person who so counsels or incites, or the body of any other person, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Definition of consent

(2) Subject to subsection (3), consent means, for the purposes of this section, the voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question.

Consent

(2.1) Consent must be present at the time the sexual activity in question takes place.

Question of law

(2.2) The question of whether no consent is obtained under subsection (3) or (4) or 265(3) is a question of law.

When no consent obtained

(3) For the purposes of this section, no consent is obtained if

(a) the agreement is expressed by the words or conduct of a person other than the complainant;

(a.1) the complainant is unconscious;

(b) the complainant is incapable of consenting to the activity for any reason other than the one referred to in paragraph (a.1);

(c) the accused counsels or incites the complainant to engage in the activity by abusing a position of trust, power or authority;

(d) the complainant expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to engage in the activity; or

(e) the complainant, having consented to engage in sexual activity, expresses, by words or conduct, a lack of agreement to continue to engage in the activity.

Subsection (3) not limiting

(4) Nothing in subsection (3) shall be construed as limiting the circumstances in which no consent is obtained.

When belief in consent not a defence

(5) It is not a defence to a charge under this section that the accused believed that the complainant consented to the activity that forms the subject-matter of the charge if

(a) the accused’s belief arose from

(i) the accused’s self-induced intoxication,

(ii) the accused’s recklessness or wilful blindness, or

(iii) any circumstance referred to in subsection (3) or (4) or 265(3) in which no consent is obtained;

(b) the accused did not take reasonable steps, in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, to ascertain that the complainant was consenting; or

(c) there is no evidence that the complainant’s voluntary agreement to the activity was affirmatively expressed by words or actively expressed by conduct.

Accused’s belief as to consent

(6) If an accused alleges that he or she believed that the complainant consented to the conduct that is the subject-matter of the charge, a judge, if satisfied that there is sufficient evidence and that, if believed by the jury, the evidence would constitute a defence, shall instruct the jury, when reviewing all the evidence relating to the determination of the honesty of the accused’s belief, to consider the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for that belief.

Annotations

  • Part V
Tags

155

Constitutionality

  • Section 155 does not violate sections 2(a), 2(d), 7, or 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; R v MS, [1996] BCJ No 2302 at para 5, 84 BCAC 104 (BCCA).

     

  • Freedom of conscience and religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter engages all crimes. The fact that an offence can be traced back to a religiously based moral system does not mean it violates an individual's freedom of religion; R v MS, [1996] BCJ No 2302 at paras 5, 53-56, 84 BCAC 104 (BCCA).

     

  • Freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter engages social, not sexual relations. Freedom of association does not protect the kinds of intimate sexual relations covered under the incest provisions; therefore, they do not violate s. 2(d); R v MS, [1996] BCJ No 2302 at paras 5, 23, 84 BCAC 104 (BCCA).

     

  • The absence of an age limitation on the concept of "child" under s. 155 does not violate the fundamental freedoms protected under s. 7 of the Charter because incestuous conduct is considered offensive to society. For those same reasons, denying the defence of consent to a charge of incest does not violate the freedoms guaranteed under section 7; R v MS, [1996] BCJ No 2302 at para 5,30-41, 84 BCAC 104 (BCCA); R v CJF, [1996] NSJ No 79 at para 32, 105 CCC (3d) (NSCA).

     

  • Finally, section 15(1) of the Charter is not engaged because it is not discriminatory to prosecute individuals who commit incest. The criminalization of the act is applied to all members of society to avoid harm to vulnerable family members and the community at large; R v MS, [1996] BCJ No 2302 at para 5,47-50, 84 BCAC 104 (BCCA).

     

Incest

155 (1) Every one commits incest who, knowing that another person is by blood relationship his or her parent, child, brother, sister, grandparent or grandchild, as the case may be, has sexual intercourse with that person.

Punishment

(2) Everyone who commits incest is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and, if the other person is under the age of 16 years, to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of five years.

Defence

(3) No accused shall be determined by a court to be guilty of an offence under this section if the accused was under restraint, duress or fear of the person with whom the accused had the sexual intercourse at the time the sexual intercourse occurred.

Definition of brother and sister

(4) In this section, brother and sister, respectively, include half-brother and half-sister.

Annotations | French

  • Section 155

     

  • Under subsection 4(5), sexual intercourse is defined as penetration, even to the slightest degree, and does not require ejaculation. Sexual intercourse under this section also includes “penile penetration of the anus”; R v DWL, 2018 BCSC 2480 at para 74; R v KH, 2015 ONSC 7760 at para 18.

     

  • Elements of the Offence:

     

  • A conviction under section 155(1) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that “sexual intercourse,” as defined in s. 4(5), has occurred between the alleged parties; R v GR, 2005 SCC 45 at para 24.

     

  • To convict an accused under subsection (2), a judge must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant was under 16 years old, that the parties are blood-related, and were aware of their blood relations; R v DWL, 2018 BCSC 2480 at para 73.

     

  • Included Offences:

     

  • The offences of sexual interference (s. 151) and sexual assault (s. 271) are not included offences under s. 155.. Sexual assault is not included as it is concerned with consent and consent is irrelevant to the charge of incest. Sexual interference is not included as it is related to the age of the victim, but incest is indifferent to the age of the victim ; R v GR, 2005 SCC 45 at paras 13-16.

     

  • Offences may be included to the offence of incest if the wording of the count charging the offender includes all the elements of other offences. For example, if the act includes the commission of a sexual assault or an underage complainant, the wording of the charge should include information about there being no consent and that the complainant is under the age of consent. To be convicted of an included offence the charge wording must put the accused on notice that the facts, if proven, could disclose the commission of an included offence, with sufficient detail of the circumstances and transactions giving rise to the principal and included offences; R v GR, 2005 SCC 45 at paras 13, 24, 32, 37-39, 56.

     

  • Defences:

     

  • The defences available under section 155(3) are limited to situations where an accused acted involuntarily due to restraint, fear, duress, or where the offender was unaware of the blood relationship. These defences apply to situations where the accused engaged in incest at the direction of their parents or guardians. The term "knowing," as used in subsection (1), does not refer to a specific intent, but applies to the defence where the offender was unaware of their blood relation to the other party; R v SJB, 2002 ABCA 143 at para 85.

     

  • Consent is not an element of the offence under s. 155 and is not an applicable defence to the charge of incest: R v GR, 2005 SCC 45 at para 16; R v MS, [1994] BCJ No 1028 at paras 6, 36; R v CJF, [1996] NSJ No 79 at paras 6, 32 (NSCA); R v SJB, 2002 ABCA 143 at para 83.

     

  • The defence of voluntary intoxication is not available for those charged under s. 155(1) because incest is an offence of general intent, and voluntary intoxication is not a defence available for general intent offences.. However, evidence of intoxication resulting in automatism that renders the accused incapable of forming general intent or voluntarily committing the act can be used as a defence to a charge under s. 155(1); R v SJB, 2002 ABCA 143 at paras 61, 86-87.

     

  • Sentencing:

     

  • The minimum sentence under subsection (2) does not apply when the complainant is over 16 years of age. However, it can serve as a sentencing guide against older complainants where they are entirely dependent on their parents and exceptionally vulnerable; R v JCJ, 2017 ONSC 6704 at para 28, aff’d in part 2020 ONCA 228 at para 8.

     

  • Denunciation and deterrence are prominent sentencing objectives for offenders convicted under this section. The offence, whether consensual or non-consensual, violates the fundamental taboos of society. The sentence must strongly denounce the conduct and deter other like-minded individuals from engaging in similar behaviour; R v PBK, 2013 ONSC 427 at para 70.

     

  • It is not a mitigating sentencing factor that an accused is the grandparent (and not the parent or guardian) of the complainant; R v W (E), [1990] OJ No 2549 (Ont Prov Ct CD).

     

Tags

156

Historical offences

156 No person shall be convicted of any sexual offence under this Act as it read from time to time before January 4, 1983 unless the conduct alleged would be an offence under this Act if it occurred on the day on which the charge was laid.

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  • Part V
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160

Bestiality

160 (1) Every person who commits bestiality is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Compelling the commission of bestiality

(2) Every person who compels another to commit bestiality is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years or is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Bestiality in presence of or by child

(3) Despite subsection (1), every person who commits bestiality in the presence of a person under the age of 16 years, or who incites a person under the age of 16 years to commit bestiality,

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.

Annotations

  • Part V
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161

Order of prohibition

161 (1) When an offender is convicted, or is discharged on the conditions prescribed in a probation order under section 730, of an offence referred to in subsection (1.1) in respect of a person who is under the age of 16 years, the court that sentences the offender or directs that the accused be discharged, as the case may be, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence or any other condition prescribed in the order of discharge, shall consider making and may make, subject to the conditions or exemptions that the court directs, an order prohibiting the offender from

(a) attending a public park or public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, schoolground, playground or community centre;

(a.1) being within two kilometres, or any other distance specified in the order, of any dwelling-house where the victim identified in the order ordinarily resides or of any other place specified in the order;

(b) seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years;

(c) having any contact — including communicating by any means — with a person who is under the age of 16 years, unless the offender does so under the supervision of a person whom the court considers appropriate; or

(d) using the Internet or other digital network, unless the offender does so in accordance with conditions set by the court.

Offences

(1.1) The offences for the purpose of subsection (1) are

(a) an offence under section 151, 152 or 155, subsection 160(2) or (3), section 163.‍1, 170, 171, 171.‍1, 172.‍1 or 172.‍2, subsection 173(2), section 271, 272, 273 or 279.‍011, subsection 279.‍02(2) or 279.‍03(2), section 280 or 281 or subsection 286.‍1(2), 286.‍2(2) or 286.‍3(2);

(b) an offence under section 144 (rape), 145 (attempt to commit rape), 149 (indecent assault on female), 156 (indecent assault on male) or 245 (common assault) or subsection 246(1) (assault with intent) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 4, 1983;

(c) an offence under subsection 146(1) (sexual intercourse with a female under 14) or section 153 (sexual intercourse with step-daughter), 155 (buggery or bestiality), 157 (gross indecency), 166 (parent or guardian procuring defilement) or 167 (householder permitting defilement) of the Criminal Code, chapter C-34 of the Revised Statutes of Canada, 1970, as it read immediately before January 1, 1988; or

(d) an offence under subsection 212(1) (procuring), 212(2) (living on the avails of prostitution of person under 18 years), 212(2.1) (aggravated offence in relation to living on the avails of prostitution of person under 18 years) or 212(4) (prostitution of person under 18 years) of this Act, as it read from time to time before the day on which this paragraph comes into force.

Duration of prohibition

(2) The prohibition may be for life or for any shorter duration that the court considers desirable and, in the case of a prohibition that is not for life, the prohibition begins on the later of

(a) the date on which the order is made; and

(b) where the offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the date on which the offender is released from imprisonment for the offence, including release on parole, mandatory supervision or statutory release.

Court may vary order

(3) A court that makes an order of prohibition or, where the court is for any reason unable to act, another court of equivalent jurisdiction in the same province, may, on application of the offender or the prosecutor, require the offender to appear before it at any time and, after hearing the parties, that court may vary the conditions prescribed in the order if, in the opinion of the court, the variation is desirable because of changed circumstances after the conditions were prescribed.

Offence

(4) Every person who is bound by an order of prohibition and who does not comply with the order is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than four years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Annotations

  • Part V
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162

Voyeurism

162 (1) Every one commits an offence who, surreptitiously, observes — including by mechanical or electronic means — or makes a visual recording of a person who is in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, if

(a) the person is in a place in which a person can reasonably be expected to be nude, to expose his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or to be engaged in explicit sexual activity;

(b) the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts, or is engaged in explicit sexual activity, and the observation or recording is done for the purpose of observing or recording a person in such a state or engaged in such an activity; or

(c) the observation or recording is done for a sexual purpose.

Definition of visual recording

(2) In this section, visual recording includes a photographic, film or video recording made by any means.

Exemption

(3) Paragraphs (1)(a) and (b) do not apply to a peace officer who, under the authority of a warrant issued under section 487.01, is carrying out any activity referred to in those paragraphs.

Printing, publication, etc., of voyeuristic recordings

(4) Every one commits an offence who, knowing that a recording was obtained by the commission of an offence under subsection (1), prints, copies, publishes, distributes, circulates, sells, advertises or makes available the recording, or has the recording in his or her possession for the purpose of printing, copying, publishing, distributing, circulating, selling or advertising it or making it available.

Punishment

(5) Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) or (4)

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years; or

(b) is guilty of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Defence

(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the acts that are alleged to constitute the offence serve the public good and do not extend beyond what serves the public good.

Question of law, motives

(7) For the purposes of subsection (6),

(a) it is a question of law whether an act serves the public good and whether there is evidence that the act alleged goes beyond what serves the public good, but it is a question of fact whether the act does or does not extend beyond what serves the public good; and

(b) the motives of an accused are irrelevant.

Annotations

  • Part V
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162.1

Publication, etc., of an intimate image without consent

162.1 (1) Everyone who knowingly publishes, distributes, transmits, sells, makes available or advertises an intimate image of a person knowing that the person depicted in the image did not give their consent to that conduct, or being reckless as to whether or not that person gave their consent to that conduct, is guilty

(a) of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years; or

(b) of an offence punishable on summary conviction.

Definition of intimate image

(2) In this section, intimate image means a visual recording of a person made by any means including a photographic, film or video recording,

(a) in which the person is nude, is exposing his or her genital organs or anal region or her breasts or is engaged in explicit sexual activity;

(b) in respect of which, at the time of the recording, there were circumstances that gave rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy; and

(c) in respect of which the person depicted retains a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time the offence is committed.

Defence

(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the conduct that forms the subject-matter of the charge serves the public good and does not extend beyond what serves the public good.

Question of fact and law, motives

(4) For the purposes of subsection (3),

(a) it is a question of law whether the conduct serves the public good and whether there is evidence that the conduct alleged goes beyond what serves the public good, but it is a question of fact whether the conduct does or does not extend beyond what serves the public good; and

(b) the motives of an accused are irrelevant.

Annotations

  • Part V
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162.2

Prohibition order

162.2 (1) When an offender is convicted, or is discharged on the conditions prescribed in a probation order under section 730, of an offence referred to in subsection 162.1(1), the court that sentences or discharges the offender, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence or any other condition prescribed in the order of discharge, may make, subject to the conditions or exemptions that the court directs, an order prohibiting the offender from using the Internet or other digital network, unless the offender does so in accordance with conditions set by the court.

Duration of prohibition

(2) The prohibition may be for any period that the court considers appropriate, including any period to which the offender is sentenced to imprisonment.

Court may vary order

(3) A court that makes an order of prohibition or, if the court is for any reason unable to act, another court of equivalent jurisdiction in the same province may, on application of the offender or the prosecutor, require the offender to appear before it at any time and, after hearing the parties, that court may vary the conditions prescribed in the order if, in the opinion of the court, the variation is desirable because of changed circumstances after the conditions were prescribed.

Offence

(4) Every person who is bound by an order of prohibition and who does not comply with the order is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than four years; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction.

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  • Part V
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163

Obscene materials

163 (1) Every person commits an offence who makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates or has in their possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or circulation any obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or any other obscene thing.

Marginal note:Idem

(2) Every person commits an offence who knowingly, without lawful justification or excuse,

(a) sells, exposes to public view or has in their possession for that purpose any obscene written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or any other obscene thing; or

(b) publicly exhibits a disgusting object or an indecent show.

(c) and (d) [Repealed, 2018, c. 29, s. 11]

Defence of public good

(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the public good was served by the acts that are alleged to constitute the offence and if the acts alleged did not extend beyond what served the public good.

Question of law and question of fact

(4) For the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether an act served the public good and whether there is evidence that the act alleged went beyond what served the public good, but it is a question of fact whether the acts did or did not extend beyond what served the public good.

Motives irrelevant

(5) For the purposes of this section, the motives of an accused are irrelevant.

(6) [Repealed, 1993, c. 46, s. 1]

(7) [Repealed, 2018, c. 29, s. 11]

Obscene publication

(8) For the purposes of this Act, any publication a dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or of sex and any one or more of the following subjects, namely, crime, horror, cruelty and violence, shall be deemed to be obscene.

Annotations

  • Part V
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163.1

Definition of child pornography

163.1 (1) In this section, child pornography means

(a) a photographic, film, video or other visual representation, whether or not it was made by electronic or mechanical means,

(i) that shows a person who is or is depicted as being under the age of eighteen years and is engaged in or is depicted as engaged in explicit sexual activity, or

(ii) the dominant characteristic of which is the depiction, for a sexual purpose, of a sexual organ or the anal region of a person under the age of eighteen years;

(b) any written material, visual representation or audio recording that advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act;

(c) any written material whose dominant characteristic is the description, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act; or

(d) any audio recording that has as its dominant characteristic the description, presentation or representation, for a sexual purpose, of sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act.

Constitutionality

  • The mandatory minimum sentences imposed in subsection (2) has been held to contravene section 12 of the Charter and is not saved by section 1: R v Joseph, 2020 ONCA 733 at paras 156-165 (NOTE: this decision was decided under a previous version of this provision which was a hybrid offence - the current version is a straight indictable offence - the reasoning would likely apply with equal force to the current provision)

Making child pornography

(2) Every person who makes, prints, publishes or possesses for the purpose of publication any child pornography is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year.

Distribution, etc. of child pornography

(3) Every person who transmits, makes available, distributes, sells, advertises, imports, exports or possesses for the purpose of transmission, making available, distribution, sale, advertising or exportation any child pornography is guilty of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year.

Constitutionality

  • The mandatory minimum sentences imposed in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 163.1(4) have been held to violation section 12 of the Charter and are not saved by section 1: R v John, 2018 ONCA 702; R v Swaby, 2018 BCCA 416.

Possession of child pornography

(4) Every person who possesses any child pornography is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.

Accessing child pornography

(4.1) Every person who accesses any child pornography is guilty of

(a) an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 10 years and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of one year; or

(b) an offence punishable on summary conviction and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than two years less a day and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of six months.

Interpretation

(4.2) For the purposes of subsection (4.1), a person accesses child pornography who knowingly causes child pornography to be viewed by, or transmitted to, himself or herself.

Aggravating factor

(4.3) If a person is convicted of an offence under this section, the court that imposes the sentence shall consider as an aggravating factor the fact that the person committed the offence with intent to make a profit.

Defence

(5) It is not a defence to a charge under subsection (2) in respect of a visual representation that the accused believed that a person shown in the representation that is alleged to constitute child pornography was or was depicted as being eighteen years of age or more unless the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of that person and took all reasonable steps to ensure that, where the person was eighteen years of age or more, the representation did not depict that person as being under the age of eighteen years.

Defence

(6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the act that is alleged to constitute the offence

(a) has a legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art; and

(b) does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years.

Question of law

(7) For greater certainty, for the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether any written material, visual representation or audio recording advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act.

Annotations

  • Part V
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164

Warrant of seizure

164 (1) A judge may issue a warrant authorizing seizure of copies of a recording, a publication, a representation or any written material, if the judge is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

(a) the recording, copies of which are kept for sale or distribution in premises within the jurisdiction of the court, is a voyeuristic recording;

(b) the recording, copies of which are kept for sale or distribution in premises within the jurisdiction of the court, is an intimate image;

(c) the publication, copies of which are kept for sale or distribution in premises within the jurisdiction of the court, is obscene, within the meaning of subsection 163(8);

(d) the representation, written material or recording, copies of which are kept in premises within the jurisdiction of the court, is child pornography as defined in section 163.1; or

(e) the representation, written material or recording, copies of which are kept in premises within the jurisdiction of the court, is an advertisement of sexual services.

Summons to occupier

(2) Within seven days of the issue of a warrant under subsection (1), the judge shall issue a summons to the occupier of the premises requiring him to appear before the court and show cause why the matter seized should not be forfeited to Her Majesty.

Owner and maker may appear

(3) The owner and the maker of the matter seized under subsection (1), and alleged to be obscene, child pornography, a voyeuristic recording, an intimate image or an advertisement of sexual services, may appear and be represented in the proceedings to oppose the making of an order for the forfeiture of the matter.

Order of forfeiture

(4) If the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the publication, representation, written material or recording referred to in subsection (1) is obscene, child pornography, a voyeuristic recording, an intimate image or an advertisement of sexual services, it may make an order declaring the matter forfeited to Her Majesty in right of the province in which the proceedings take place, for disposal as the Attorney General may direct.

Disposal of matter

(5) If the court is not satisfied that the publication, representation, written material or recording referred to in subsection (1) is obscene, child pornography, a voyeuristic recording, an intimate image or an advertisement of sexual services, it shall order that the matter be restored to the person from whom it was seized without delay after the time for final appeal has expired.

Appeal

(6) An appeal lies from an order made under subsection (4) or (5) by any person who appeared in the proceedings

(a) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of law alone,

(b) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of fact alone, or

(c) on any ground of appeal that involves a question of mixed law and fact,

as if it were an appeal against conviction or against a judgment or verdict of acquittal, as the case may be, on a question of law alone under Part XXI and sections 673 to 696 apply with such modifications as the circumstances require.

Consent

(7) If an order is made under this section by a judge in a province with respect to one or more copies of a publication, a representation, written material or a recording, no proceedings shall be instituted or continued in that province under section 162, 162.1, 163, 163.1 or 286.4 with respect to those or other copies of the same publication, representation, written material or recording without the consent of the Attorney General.

Definitions

(8) In this section,

advertisement of sexual services means any material  —  including a photographic, film, video, audio or other recording, made by any means, a visual representation or any written material  —  that is used to advertise sexual services contrary to section 286.4; (publicité de services sexuels)

court means

(a) in the Province of Quebec, the Court of Quebec, the municipal court of Montreal and the municipal court of Quebec,

(a.1) in the Province of Ontario, the Superior Court of Justice,

(b) in the Provinces of New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, the Court of Queen’s Bench,

(c) in the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, the Trial Division of the Supreme Court,

(c.1) [Repealed, 1992, c. 51, s. 34]

(d) in the Provinces of Nova Scotia, British Columbia and Prince Edward Island, in Yukon and in the Northwest Territories, the Supreme Court, and

(e) in Nunavut, the Nunavut Court of Justice; (tribunal)

crime comic[Repealed, 2018, c. 29, s. 12]

intimate image has the same meaning as in subsection 162.1(2); (image intime)

judge means a judge of a court; (juge)

voyeuristic recording means a visual recording within the meaning of subsection 162(2) that is made as described in subsection 162(1). (enregistrement voyeuriste)

Annotations

  • Part V
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