515

Constitutionality

Release order without conditions

515 (1) Subject to this section, when an accused who is charged with an offence other than an offence listed in section 469 is taken before a justice, the justice shall, unless a plea of guilty by the accused is accepted, make a release order in respect of that offence, without conditions, unless the prosecutor, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause, in respect of that offence, why the detention of the accused in custody is justified or why an order under any other provision of this section should be made.

 

Annotations

  • Section 515(1)
  • “Justice,” is defined in section 2.

     

  • With respect to section 515(1), the default position for bail is to release accused persons without any conditions. The Crown has to demonstrate why conditions should be imposed or the accused should be detained. Detention of an accused or their release on conditions will be justified where is it necessary to address the statutory criteria outlined in s.515(10)(a)-(c): R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 67; R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 1 and 21.

     

  • Section 515(1) does not apply to offences listed in section 469, or offences listed in section 515(6). If an accused is charged with any offence in those sections, the justice must detain them unless they can justify their release on the basis of the three grounds set out in section 5515(10)(a)-(c): R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 45; R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 21.

     

  • Section 515(1), along with 515(2) and 515(2.01) codifies the “ladder principle.” This principle requires that a justice consider and reject each rung of the ladder individually before moving to a more restrictive form of release. The lowest rung in the ladder is a release without conditions (s. 515(1)), following by the increasingly more onerous conditions set out in paragraphs 515(2)(a) (second rung,) to 515(2)(e) (highest rung): R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at paras 29-30, and 44.

     

  • Section 515(1) and the ladder principle applies to peace bonds (s. 810, 810.01, 810.011, 810.02, 810.1, 810.2) This applies in a rare case where a peace bond defendant is arrested and held for bail. Any conditions imposed must be necessary to ensure the attendance of the defendant at the peace bond hearing or it must be designed to address the feared conduct sworn to the information. The imposition of conditions is also guided by the “ladder principle”. Conditions placed on the defendant relating to fear sworn to by the informant should not exceed the conditions provided for by the peace bond itself. In most cases, it should be less severe: R v Penunsi, 2019 SCC 39 at paras 75-80.

Release order with conditions

(2) If the justice does not make an order under subsection (1), the justice shall, unless the prosecutor shows cause why the detention of the accused is justified, make a release order that sets out the conditions directed by the justice under subsection (4) and, as the case may be,

(a) an indication that the release order does not include any financial obligations;

(b) the accused’s promise to pay a specified amount if they fail to comply with a condition of the order;

(c) the obligation to have one or more sureties, with or without the accused’s promise to pay a specified amount if they fail to comply with a condition of the order;

(d) the obligation to deposit money or other valuable security in a specified amount or value, with or without the accused’s promise to pay a specified amount if they fail to comply with a condition of the order; or

(e) if the accused is not ordinarily resident in the province in which they are in custody or does not ordinarily reside within 200 kilometres of the place in which they are in custody, the obligation to deposit money or other valuable security in a specified amount or value, with or without the accused’s promise to pay a specified amount by the justice if they fail to comply with a condition of the order and with or without sureties.

 

Annotations

  • s515(2)
  • A “release order” is defined in section 2.

     

  • A release order will be in a form (Form 10) signed by the judge or justice that outlines the conditions an individual must follow when released on bail. Subsection (4) provides for the conditions that may be imposed. Section 515(2) and paragraphs(a)-(e) outline the “ladder principle,” by showing forms of release from the least restrictive to the most restrictive: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 29, 44, and 46.

     

  • The justice has discretion under section 515(4) of the Code to impose terms that are specific to the circumstances of the accused: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 42; R v Singh, 2018 ONSC 5336 at para 22.

     

  • Each condition must be considered individually and must be rejected before moving to a more restrictive form of release. The justice ought to reject conditions that would not address concerns outlined in section 515(10)(a)-(c). The onus is on the Crown to justify a more restrictive form of release: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 para 67; R v Adams, 2021 ONSC 2398 at para 25.

     

  • s515(2)(b)
  • Section 515(2)(b) refers to the next most restrictive release,. This condition involves an accused promising to pay a specified amount if they fail to comply with any of the conditions in their order. A promise to pay is just as effective as a cash deposit for addressing flight and safety concerns, and so a cash deposit is not required to address those issues: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 48-49 and 52.

     

  • s515(2)(c)
  • Section 515(2)(c) is the next most restrictive form of release. Release with a surety is an onerous form of release, and it should only be required when necessary: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 67.

     

  • s515(2)(d)
  • Section 515(2)(d) requires the accused to deposit cash or other valuable security as a condition of release. The justice can require that the accused also promise to pay a specific amount if they breach the conditions of their release order. Examples of “other valuable security” are listed in section 2. Requiring a deposit of money is considered one of the most restrictive forms of release and should only be imposed in exceptional circumstances and when release with a surety is not possible: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at paras 30, 48-4967.

     

  • The amount set by a justice must not be beyond what an accused or their surety would have readily available to them. The amount must not be higher than what is necessary to satisfy the justice’s concerns under section 515(10). A justice or judge is obliged, when setting the amount, to inquire about the accused’s ability to pay: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 56 and para 67.

     

  • s515(2)(e)
  • This provision sets out the most restrictive form of release. It requires both a cash deposit and a surety. It can only be imposed if the accused is not ordinarily resident in the province in which they are in custody or does not ordinarily reside within 200 kilometres of the place in which they are in custody.When deciding to impose this condition, a justice should consider that a pledge with a surety is less onerous and has the same effect as a deposit in satisfying a flight or safety risk: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 48-49 and 52.

Imposition of least onerous form of release

(2.‍01) The justice shall not make an order containing the conditions referred to in one of the paragraphs (2)‍(b) to (e) unless the prosecution shows cause why an order containing the conditions referred to in the preceding paragraphs for any less onerous form of release would be inadequate.

 

Annotations

  • s515(2.01)
  • Section 515(2)(2.01) codifies the “ladder principle”. Subsections 515(2)(b) through (e) represents a step up the ladder. The ladder principle requires that the justice consider and reject each rung of the ladder before imposing a more onerous form of release. It is the Crown’s onus to justify why a more onerous form of release is necessary to meet one or more of the grounds listed under section 515(10): R v Adams, 2021 ONSC 2398 at para. 25

Promise to pay favoured over deposit

(2.‍02) The justice shall favour a promise to pay an amount over the deposit of an amount of money if the accused or the surety, if applicable, has reasonably recoverable assets.

Annotations

  • Section 515(2.02)

     

  • Reasonably recoverable assets are assets offered in a pledge to pay that must cause a risk for the accused that is actually meaningful. A judge or justice determines whether assets meet this definition. R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at fn 3.

     

  • A judge or justice has tools at their disposal to determine if a surety has assets to meet this definition. A judge or justice can provide the sureties an opportunity to bring financial documents or other material to provide further information: R v Phillips, 2020 ONSC 6189 at para 32.

     

Restraint in use of surety

(2.‍03) For greater certainty, before making an order requiring that the accused have a surety, the justice shall be satisfied that this requirement is the least onerous form of release possible for the accused in the circumstances.

Annotations

  • Section 515(2.03)

     

  • A surety is an individual who promises to supervise an accused and ensure the accused abides by the conditions given to them when released: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at fn 1.; R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at fn 5.

     

  • This provision requires a justice to carefully evaluate whether a surety is necessary. A surety release should only be considered when lesser forms of release cannot satisfy the concerns outlined in section 515(10)(a)-(c). R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 67.; R v Tunney, 2018 ONSC 961 at para 46.

     

Power of justice — sureties

(2.‍1) If, under subsection (2) or any other provision of this Act, a judge, justice or court makes a release order with a requirement for sureties, the judge, justice or court may name particular persons as sureties.

Annotations

  • Section 515(2.1)

     

  • In naming a person as a surety, a judge, justice, or court must follow the guidelines under section 515.1(1), unless they meet the rules for exception under section 515.1(2).

     

  • The process for naming a surety can include receiving evidence through questioning the surety at the bail hearing. However, this process does not have to happen in court. A judge or justice can decide on the suitability of a surety without receiving answers under oath, such as through a questionnaire. The method for naming a surety depends on the circumstances of the case and local practices. R v Tunney, 2018 ONSC 961 at paras 39-42.

     

Appearance of the accused

(2.‍2) If, by this Act, the appearance of an accused is required for the purposes of judicial interim release, the accused shall appear personally but the justice may allow the accused to appear by videoconference or, subject to subsection (2.‍3), by audioconference, if the technological means is satisfactory to the justice.

When consent required for audioconference

(2.‍3) If the accused cannot appear by closed-circuit television or videoconference and the evidence of a witness is to be taken at the appearance, the consent of the prosecutor and the accused is required for the appearance of the accused by audioconference.

Factors to consider

(3) In making an order under this section, the justice shall consider any relevant factors, including,

(a) whether the accused is charged with an offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner; or

(b) whether the accused has been previously convicted of a criminal offence.

Annotations

  • Section 515(3)

     

  • Section 515(3) refers to factors that should be considered when making an order for detention or imposing conditions on release. This includes consideration of whether the accused is charged with an intimate partner related offence and whether the accused has been previously convicted of any criminal offence. 515(3)(a) was added to the Criminal Code in 2019 and represents a statutory recognition of Parliament’s concerns about intimate partner violence. R v Shaver, 2022 BCSC 525 at para 37 and 43.

     

  • Prior convictions are considered because they support the inference that the accused may pose a risk to the public. Prior charges of intimate partner violence are considered to allow the justice to consider whether the accused may pose a threat to the victim or future partners. This is in recognition of the unpredictable and dangerous nature of intimate partner violence. R v Shaver, 2022 BCSC 525 at paras 42-48.

     

Conditions authorized

(4) When making an order under subsection (2), the justice may direct the accused to comply with one or more of the following conditions specified in the order:

(a) report at specified times to a peace officer, or other person, designated in the order;

(b) remain within a specified territorial jurisdiction;

(c) notify a peace officer or other person designated in the order of any change in their address, employment or occupation;

(d) abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order, except in accordance with any specified conditions that the justice considers necessary;

(e) abstain from going to any place or entering any geographic area specified in the order, except in accordance with any specified conditions that the justice considers necessary;

(f) deposit all their passports as specified in the order;

(g) comply with any other specified condition that the justice considers necessary to ensure the safety and security of any victim of or witness to the offence; and

(h) comply with any other reasonable conditions specified in the order that the justice considers desirable.

Annotations

  • Section 515(4)

     

  • Section 515(4) allows a judge or justice to impose terms that meet the specific circumstances of the accused. These terms must also be imposed only if they are necessary to address the concerns in section 515(10)(a)-(c). The terms must not be imposed for punishment or to change the behaviour of the accused. R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 42 and 67.; R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 22.

     

  • The conditions set out in subsections 515(4)(a), (b), (c), and (e) are meant to address an individual’s flight risk or the risk of not attending their court date, pursuant to section 515(10)(a). 515(4)(d) relates to non-communication orders that are meant to address public safety and security, pursuant to section 515(10)(b). R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 22.

     

  • Under this provision, justices are allowed to impose conditions beyond those listed in 515(4)(a)-(g).Even with non-enumerated conditions, the justice need to respect the ladder principle Non-enumerated conditions need to be minimal, necessary, reasonable, the least onerous in the circumstances, and sufficiently connected to a risk outlined in section 515(10). R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at paras 23-24, 87.; R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 67.; R v Penunsi, 2019 SCC 39 at paras 78-80.

     

  • Under this provision, conditions must be specific to the individual circumstances of the accused and not automatically imposed. The only bail condition that should be added automatically is the condition to attend court, and conditions that must be considered for offences under section 515(4.1) to (4.3). R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 25,88.; R v Birtchnell, 2019 ONCJ 198 at para 6.

     

  • Conditions will only be considered reasonable if it is realistic for the accused to respect them.For example, it can be difficult for a person who has a drug or alcohol addicition to abide by a condition requiring abstinence. Substance use abstinence conditions imposed on a person with a mental health issue or addiction will not be appropriate if they do not address one of the three concerns in section 515(10). Imposing such conditions can have the effect of punishing the accused for mental health concerns and can lead to harmful withdrawal effects. If an abstinence condition is necessary, the condition must be specifically tailored to address the actual risk – such as by prohibiting an accused to drink alcohol outside their home. Conditions that are intended to help rehabilitate an accused may not be appropriate unless they are necessary to address the risks posed by the accused. Even when the condition is linked to the accused’s risk, the justice should balance the advantages of the proposed condition for mitigating concerns about the primary, secondary, or tertiary grounds, against the fact that a breach of condition could result in additional criminal charges under section 145(3). R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at paras. 87, 92-93; R v Omeasoo, 2013 ABPC 328 at paras 33 and 37-38.

     

  • Conditions should be understandable and precise, because it may be difficult for the accused to comply with broad and vague conditions. Additionally, broad and vague conditions provide an inappropriately wide scope for police to charge an accused with breaching conditions under section 145(3). Examples of vague conditions include, “be amendable to the rules of the house,” and “obey curfew and house rules.” These conditions can be subject to considerable interpretation, and they provide no guidance or the surety or the police as to what might be considered a breach. The condition “keep the peace and be of good behaviour,is not a required condition for bail and should be reviewed when proposed. R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 94.; R v K.R., 2014 ONCJ 566 at paras 10-18.; R v A.D.B., 2009 SKPC 120 at paras 15-17, 22.

     

  • When assessing the reasonableness and necessity of a condition, the justice must also consider that a failure to comply with an imposed conditions becomes a separate crime against the administration of justice. R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 90.

     

Condition prohibiting possession of firearms, etc.

(4.1) When making an order under subsection (2), in the case of an accused who is charged with

(a) an offence in the commission of which violence against a person was used, threatened or attempted,

(a.1) a terrorism offence,

(b) an offence under section 264 (criminal harassment),

(b.1) an offence under section 423.1 (intimidation of a justice system participant),

(b.2) an offence relating to the contravention of any of sections 9 to 14 of the Cannabis Act,

(c) an offence relating to the contravention of any of sections 5 to 7 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,

(d) an offence that involves, or the subject-matter of which is, a firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance, or

(e) an offence under subsection 20(1) of the Security of Information Act, or an offence under subsection 21(1) or 22(1) or section 23 of that Act that is committed in relation to an offence under subsection 20(1) of that Act,

the justice shall add to the order a condition prohibiting the accused from possessing a firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance, or all those things, until the accused is dealt with according to law unless the justice considers that such a condition is not required in the interests of the safety of the accused or the safety and security of a victim of the offence or of any other person.

 

Annotations

  • Section 515(4.1)

     

  • Section 515(4.1) creates a presumptive prohibition condition prohibiting firearms when an accused is charged with the listed offences. For example, if the accused was found to have a loaded and unsecured firearm in his apartment, a condition prohibiting him from possessing firearms and requiring him to surrender them to authorities is required: R v Rayzak, 2002 CanLII 42520 at para 21 (ONSC).

     

  • Breaching a condition under section 515(4.1) can result in a conviction under section 117.01(1): R v Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at para 100; R v Moar, 2021 ABQB 984 at para 23.

Surrender, etc.

(4.11) Where the justice adds a condition described in subsection (4.1) to an order made under subsection (2), the justice shall specify in the order the manner and method by which

(a) the things referred to in subsection (4.1) that are in the possession of the accused shall be surrendered, disposed of, detained, stored or dealt with; and

(b) the authorizations, licences and registration certificates held by the person shall be surrendered.

Reasons

(4.12) Where the justice does not add a condition described in subsection (4.1) to an order made under subsection (2), the justice shall include in the record a statement of the reasons for not adding the condition.

Additional conditions

(4.2) Before making an order under subsection (2), in the case of an accused who is charged with an offence referred to in subsection (4.3), the justice shall consider whether it is desirable, in the interests of the safety and security of any person, particularly a victim of or witness to the offence or a justice system participant, to include as a condition of the order

(a) that the accused abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order, except in accordance with any specified conditions that the justice considers necessary;

(a.‍1) that the accused abstain from going to any place or entering any geographic area specified in the order, except in accordance with any specified conditions that the justice considers necessary; or

(b) that the accused comply with any other condition specified in the order that the justice considers necessary to ensure the safety and security of those persons.

Offences

(4.3) The offences for the purposes of subsection (4.2) are

(a) a terrorism offence;

(b) an offence described in section 264 or 423.1;

(c) an offence in the commission of which violence against a person was used, threatened or attempted; and

(d) an offence under subsection 20(1) of the Security of Information Act, or an offence under subsection 21(1) or 22(1) or section 23 of that Act that is committed in relation to an offence under subsection 20(1) of that Act.

Detention in custody

(5) Where the prosecutor shows cause why the detention of the accused in custody is justified, the justice shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he is dealt with according to law and shall include in the record a statement of his reasons for making the order.

Annotations

  • Section 515(5)

     

  • The detention of an accused must based on the grounds of detention outlined in section 515(10)(a)-(c). R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 67.

     

  • Reasons provided by the justice must be sufficient to allow a reviewing court to determine if the justice adequately considered and properly applied the statutory requirement for detention under section 515(10)(a)-(c). The reasons must go further than stating that detention is justified on one or more grounds. They must explain the reasoning leading to that conclusion and they must be linked to the evidence relating to the grounds for detention. R v Vanderwal, 2016 ONSC 1889 at para 38 ; R v Wong, 2008 Canlii 67420 (ON SC) at para 7 ; R v Reid, 2011 ONSC 7291 at para 16.

     

Order of detention

(6) Unless the accused, having been given a reasonable opportunity to do so, shows cause why the accused’s detention in custody is not justified, the justice shall order, despite any provision of this section, that the accused be detained in custody until the accused is dealt with according to law, if the accused is charged

(a) with an indictable offence, other than an offence listed in section 469,

(i) that is alleged to have been committed while at large after being released in respect of another indictable offence pursuant to the provisions of this Part or section 679 or 680,

(ii) that is an offence under section 467.11, 467.111, 467.12 or 467.13, or a serious offence alleged to have been committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with, a criminal organization,

(iii) that is an offence under any of sections 83.02 to 83.04 and 83.18 to 83.23 or otherwise is alleged to be a terrorism offence,

(iv) that is an offence under subsection 16(1) or (2), 17(1), 19(1), 20(1) or 22(1) of the Security of Information Act,

(v) that is an offence under subsection 21(1) or 22(1) or section 23 of the Security of Information Act committed in relation to an offence referred to in subparagraph (iv),

(vi) that is an offence under section 99, 100 or 103,

(vii) that is an offence under section 244 or 244.2, or an offence under section 239, 272 or 273, subsection 279(1) or section 279.1, 344 or 346 that is alleged to have been committed with a firearm, or

(viii) that is alleged to involve, or whose subject-matter is alleged to be, a firearm, a cross-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, any ammunition or prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance, and that is alleged to have been committed while the accused was under a prohibition order within the meaning of subsection 84(1);

(b) with an indictable offence, other than an offence listed in section 469 and is not ordinarily resident in Canada,

(b.‍1) with an offence in the commission of which violence was allegedly used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner, and the accused has been previously convicted of an offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened or attempted against any intimate partner of theirs;

(c) with an offence under any of subsections 145(2) to (5) that is alleged to have been committed while they were at large after being released in respect of another offence under the provisions of this Part or section 679, 680 or 816; or

(d) with having committed an offence punishable by imprisonment for life under any of sections 5 to 7 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act or the offence of conspiring to commit such an offence.

Annotations

  • Section 515(6)

     

  • Section 515(6) is commonly referred to as a “reverse onus” provision. If an accused is charged with one of the listed offences in this provision, the onus is on the accused to demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, why his or her detention is not necessary based on the grounds for detention under section 515(10)(a)-(c). R v T.Q.N., 2015 ONCJ 560 at para 12 ; R v George, 2009 ONCJ 286 at para 39.

     

  • The reverse onus circumstance in this provision is an exception to the basic right to bail under section 11(e) of the Charter. R v Pearson, [1992] 3 SCR 665 at 142, 12 CRR (2d) 1 p 699.

     

  • The presumption of release on the least onerous conditions, or the “ladder principle”, does not apply in reverse onus situations. R v Campbell, 2021 ONSC 508 at paras 21-22 ; R v Ishmael, 2019 ONSC 596 at paras 28-34.

     

  • Note case law that is conflicting: R v Downey, [2018] OJ No 6133 (ON SC) at para 26.

     

Reasons

(6.1) If the justice orders that an accused to whom subsection (6) applies be released, the justice shall include in the record a statement of the justice’s reasons for making the order.

Release order

(7) If an accused to whom subsection (6) applies shows cause why their detention in custody is not justified, the justice shall make a release order under this section. If the accused was already at large on a release order, the new release order may include any additional conditions described in subsections (4) to (4.‍2) that the justice considers desirable.

(8) [Repealed, 2019, c. 25, s. 225]

Sufficiency of record

(9) For the purposes of subsections (5) and (6), it is sufficient if a record is made of the reasons in accordance with the provisions of Part XVIII relating to the taking of evidence at preliminary inquiries.

Written reasons

(9.1) Despite subsection (9), if the justice orders that the accused be detained in custody primarily because of a previous conviction of the accused, the justice shall state that reason, in writing, in the record.

Justification for detention in custody

(10) For the purposes of this section, the detention of an accused in custody is justified only on one or more of the following grounds:

(a) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law;

(b) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public, including any victim of or witness to the offence, or any person under the age of 18 years, having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice; and

(c) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances, including

(i) the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case,

(ii) the gravity of the offence,

(iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence, including whether a firearm was used, and

(iv) the fact that the accused is liable, on conviction, for a potentially lengthy term of imprisonment or, in the case of an offence that involves, or whose subject-matter is, a firearm, a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of three years or more.

Annotations

  • Section 515(10)

     

  • The denial of bail is only justified where it is linked to the grounds in 515(10)(a)-(c), commonly referred to as primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds: R v Antic, 2017 SCC 27 at para 34; R v J.B., 2020 ONSC 4342 at para 21.

     

  • In a bail decision, the presumption of innocence remains a constant consideration for a justice when making the determination to deny bail: R v Simonelli, 2021 ONSC 354 at para 26.

     

  • Section 515(10)(a)-(c) must be considered to determine the necessary conditions to be imposed if the accused is released. R v Zora, 2020 SCC 14 at para 84.

     

  • Grounds for detention

     

    • (A) where the detention is necessary to ensure his or her attendance in court in order to be dealt with according to law; (primary ground)

       

  • When assessing whether to detain under the primary ground, the court must consider the circumstances of the offence, whether the accused tried to run when arrested, the accused’s reaction when arrested, if the accused lied to the police officer, if an accused has prior convictions of failing to attend court, and the accused’s overall connection to the community, including where they live, their stability, their family status, and their employment. Additionally, the court can also consider whether the accused could be subject to a potentially long prison sentence if convicted, as the accused may be less willing to attend trial: R v Pearson, [1992] 3 SCR 665 at p 696-697; R v Penosway, 2018 QCCQ 8863 at para 82; R v Harris, 2020 BCPC 179 at para 51-58.

     

    • (B) where the detention is necessary for the protection or safety of the public…(secondary ground)

       

  • Detention under the secondary grounds requires an assessment of two distinct but related factors: an individual must pose a substantial likelihood of committing an offence, and this likelihood must threaten the protection or safety of the public: R v Morales, [1992] 3 SCR 711 at 726, 12 C.R.R. (2d) 31 at p 736-740.
  • The “substantial likelihood” factor does not require a court to make exact predictions or prove a fact regarding future dangerousness. Rather, the focus is on the “likelihood,” of future criminal conduct occurring. Specifically, “substantial” means there is a probability of criminal conduct rather than a simple possibility, and this threshold has been described as “significantly likely.”: R v Morales, [1992] 3 SCR 711 at 739, 12 C.R.R. (2d) 31 at p 736-740; R v Manasseri, 2017 ONCA 226 at para 87; R v J.B., 2020 ONSC 4342 at para 27.

     

  • When assessing the secondary ground, the court will look at a variety of factors, including: the nature and/or seriousness of the offence, the accused’s criminal record, the strength of the Crown’s case, if the accused was already on bail at the time of the alleged offences, and if the accused has made attempts to interfere with witnesses or evidence for the matter he is charged. If the Crown's case is weak, less weight can be put on the charges on which the accused is seeking bail when assessing the danger to the public if they are released. R v J.B., 2020 ONSC 4342 at para 24-29.; R v Modeste, 2009 Canlii 67002 (ON SC) at paras 27-28.; R v Mallaley, 2020 ONSC 7178 at paras 19, 23.

     

  • Once the court determines there is a substantial likelihood of re-offending that would endanger the safety of the public, the burden shifts to the the accused to show that an adequate plan can manage these risks to justify release. For the plan to be considered adequate, the court must be satisfied that the plan will manage the risk insofar that the likelihood of the accused committing further offences is no longer substantial. R v Dang, 2015 ONSC 4254 at paras 38-44.; R v J.B., 2020 ONSC 4342 at para 29.

     

    • (C) if the detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice… (tertiary ground)

       

  • Detention on the tertiary ground is justified where it is required to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice. Justices must be guided by the perspective of the “public,” which is a perspective of a reasonable person who is informed about the circumstances of the case, our Charter values, and the meaning behind this provision. This definition excludes people who react impulsively and excludes legal experts. R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at paras 72-74; R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64 at para 41, 108.

     

  • 515(10)(c) can be a stand-alone ground for detention and should not be restricted to rare or severe cases: R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at para 47 and paras 50-54.

     

  • In deciding detention under this ground, a justice must make the decision objectively based on the four factors set out in the provision. R v Hall, 2002 SCC 64 at paras 40-41.

     

  • Under section 515(10)(c)(i), a justice must consider the apparent strength of the prosecution’s case. For example, physical evidence may be more reliable than a statement made by a witness, and circumstantial may be less reliable than direct evidence. Additionally, the amount of evidence available may reinforce the apparent strength of the case. Finally the court must also assess any defence raised by the accused if raised at the bail stage. R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at para 58-59.

     

  • Under section 515(10)(c)(ii), a justice must determine the gravity of the offence in comparison to other offences in the Criminal Code. The court can do this by comparing the maximum and minimum sentences available for the offence. R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at para 60.

     

  • Under section 515(10)(c)(iii), a justice must consider whether the offence is particularly violent, heinous, or hateful, if it occurred in the context of domestic violence,a criminal gang, or terrorist organization, and if the victim was a vulnerable person such as a child, elderly person, or person with disability. If the offence was committed by several people, the level the accused participated will be relevant under this provision. This list is not exhaustive. R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at para 61.

     

  • Under section 515(10)(c)(iv), a justice must examine on a case-by-case basis if the accused may beliable for a lengthy prison sentence. To do so, a justice must consider all the circumstances of the case known at the time of the bail hearing and the principles of sentencing. What constitutes “lengthy term of imprisonment,” is not defined, however it is not limited to a life sentence. R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at paras 62-65.

     

  • A justice must consider all relevant circumstances. Examples of other relevant circumstances considered under this ground include the personal circumstances of the accused, such as their age, criminal record, physical or mental health, membership in criminal organization, the status of the victim, the impact on society, and if the trial of the accused will be held at a much later date. R v St. Cloud, 2015 SCC 27 at para 71.

     

  • The court can also consider a change in attitude and behaviour in the accused since the arrest and a determination to improve oneself. The socio-historical context of the overincarceration and systemic discrimination against indigenous people in Canada should also be considered under this ground. R v Jaser, 2020 ONCA 606 at para 92.; R v Duncan, 2020 BCSC 590 at para 45, 49.

     

  • The COVID-19 pandemic is also a factor considered under this ground. The significance of the pandemic on a justice’s decision should depend on the individual case and the evidence provided to the court about the circumstances of the accused and of the correctional institution, including the accused’s vulnerability to COVID-19, and the COVID-19 cases to date and the measures taken in that institution. However, the pandemic should not overwhelm the analysis. R v Duncan, 2020 BCSC 590 at 45, 49 ; R v Jaser, 2020 ONCA 606 at paras 102-103.; R v Latimer, 2020 BCSC 892 at paras 81-82.

     

Detention in custody for offence listed in section 469

(11) Where an accused who is charged with an offence mentioned in section 469 is taken before a justice, the justice shall order that the accused be detained in custody until he is dealt with according to law and shall issue a warrant in Form 8 for the committal of the accused.

Order re no communication

(12) A justice who orders that an accused be detained in custody under this section may include in the order a direction that the accused abstain from communicating, directly or indirectly, with any victim, witness or other person identified in the order, except in accordance with such conditions specified in the order as the justice considers necessary.

Consideration of victim’s safety and security

(13) A justice who makes an order under this section shall include in the record of the proceedings a statement that he or she considered the safety and security of every victim of the offence when making the order.

Copy to victim

(14) If an order is made under this section, the justice shall, on request by a victim of the offence, cause a copy of the order to be given to the victim.

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